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Within the past year, there have been changes of formidable
importance in many major areas of domestic relations, both
nationally and in Virginia. This article will review the major
judicial and legislative developments in family law in Virginia
in the context of national domestic relations law, with an eye
toward trends in Virginia.
The Virginia Court of Appeals considered issues regarding
the quantity of evidence required to determine adultery and
desertion and clarified that the standard of proof is extremely
clear and extremely convincing. In the area of property distribu-
tion, the court of appeals analyzed "double-dipping" and division
of pensions cases. In custody and child support decisions, choice
of law remains a major source of litigation. Virginia circuit
courts dealt with many familiar issues, relying on general rules
to establish decisions. The previously abolished alienation of
affections cause of action' has resurfaced in many courts
around the country2 but, thus far, Virginia courts have not
heard such cases since the statutory abolition.3 The cases that
* Assistant Professor, Regent University School of Law. BA., 1980, Albany Uni-
versity; J.D., 1988, Syracuse University; Law School Liaison member to the Virginia
State Bar Family Law Section Board of Governors.
1. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (Repl. Vol. 1992) (repealing cause of action for
alienation of affection).
2. The following five state courts have heard cases involving the causes of action
of alienation of affections: Idaho, in O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986)
(abolishing the cause of action); Iowa, in Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304. N.W.2d 790
(Iowa 1981) (abolishing the right to recover); Kentucky, in Hoye v. Hoye, 824 S.W.2d
422 (Ky. 1992) (abolishing the cause of action for alienation of affections); South Car-
olina, in Russo v. Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750 (S.C. 1992) (abolishing prospectively the
cause of action); and Washington, in Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980)
(noting the common law right was never adopted by the legislation). In each of these
cases, the cause of action previously did not exist in the specific state jurisdictions.
3. A motion for judgment alleging alienation of affections and infliction of emo-
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follow give insight into trends and values in contemporary do-
mestic relations law and proclivity in family law throughout the
Commonwealth of Virginia.
This year, the Virginia General Assembly came in like a
political lion but went out like a lamb, as very few major
changes occurred. Statutory revisions and additions regarding
rehabilitative spousal support, particular aspects of child sup-
port, family abuse, and abortion were of particular significance.
New laws enacted last year have raised expectations for coming
years. In his final State of the Commonwealth Address, now
former Governor George Allen discussed renewing respect and
support for Virginia families4 in recent legislation. The 1998
General Assembly Session will continue many initiatives begun
in the prior winter term, and highlights of these initiatives will
be reviewed as well.
II. JUDICIAL OPINIONS
The Virginia Court of Appeals and the circuit courts had
opportunities to revisit past decisions and look into the future
with current decisions. Some of the most significant opinions of
record are outlined in the following section.
tional distress based on heart balm requesting compensatory and punitive damages
remains pending in a Virginia Beach Circuit Court. See Motion for Judgment,
McDermott v. Reynolds (Virginia Beach 1998) (No. CL98-1900); letter from Suzanne L.
Bailey, Senior Attorney (July 22, 1998) (on file with author). To date, no court since
the 1968 repeal of the cause of action of alienation of affections has allowed a plain-
tiff to recover damages sustained as a result of third party interference in the mari-
tal contract. Two Virginia decisions are worth noting. In Couture v. Thompson, a
Norfolk Circuit Court dismissed a cause of action for breach of a promise to marry
that requested punitive damages. See Couture v. Thompson, 13 Va. Cir. 178, 178
(Norfolk 1988). In Smith v. Teunis, a Fairfax County Circuit ,Court, among some
excellent dicta regarding the rationale for abolition of the alienation of affections
actions, dismissed the heart balm action, pointing out the inconsistency of holding
adultery as criminal conduct without civil remedy. See Smith v. Teunis, 16 Va. Cir.
135, 138 (Fairfax County 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Repl. Vol. 1996) ("Any
person, being married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with any person
not his or her spouse shall be guilty of adultery, punishable as a Class 4 misdemean-
or.").
4. Governor Allen specifically referred to the 18-year effort to pass a "true and
honest parental notification" law in Virginia. Governor George Allen, The State of the
Commonwealth Address to the General Assembly and the People of Virginia (Jan. 14,
1998).
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A. Virginia Court of Appeals
1. Divorce
In two important cases this year, the court of appeals consid-
ered what evidence is required to determine adultery and what
weight that evidence is given. A third case considered desertion
evidence thresholds.
In Romero v. Colbow,5 the Chesapeake Circuit Court granted,
despite a contrary commissioner's report,' a divorce to the hus-
band on the ground of adultery, thereby denying the wife
spousal support.' The court of appeals, however, held that the
strong circumstantial evidence' and the wife's inconsistent tes-
timony at the commissioner's hearing9 was not sufficient to es-
tablish "clear and positive and convincing" evidence needed to
support the husband's charge of adultery.' ° The salient point is
that even evidence raising substantial suspicion does not
amount to clear and convincing evidence. The trial court con-
cluded that the proof of adultery was very clear; however, the
court of appeals did not agree and stated that "strongly suspi-
cious circumstances are inadequate."" In the face of nearly
5. 27 Va. App. 88, 497 S.E.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1998).
6. See id at 91, 497 S.E.2d at 518. The commissioner's report noted that the
wife was not a credible witness after she denied her adulterous relationship and then
invoked the Fifth Amendnient at significant points later in her testimony. See id.
7. See id. at 92, 497 S.E.2d at 518.
8. The evidence offered at the hearing and trial included photographs of the wife
in the residence of her alleged paramour "dressed only in a sweater, .[in which] she
appeared to he removing or putting on underclothes." See id. at 91, 497 S.E.2d at
517. Also, telephone company replacement records showed numerous calls between the
wife and her paramour during her husband's military absence. See d. at 90-91, 497
S.E.2d at 517.
9. Wife admitted that she used Ramirez' credit cards in 1992, signed
his name, and picked up his laundry. When asked to identify the indi-
vidual in the picture[s with her], wife asserted her Fifth Amendmnt
privilege against self-incrimination. She testified that she had not had
sexual relations with anyone other than husband from before the parties'
separation until the time of the commissioner's hearing ... however, she
then recanted her denial and again invoked the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 91, 497 S.E.2d at 518. The court reasoned that because adultery is a crime in
Virginia "the presumption of innocence" must apply. Id. at 94, 497 S.E.2d at 519
(quoting Haskins v. Haskins, 188 Va. 525, 530-31, 50 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1948)).
10. Id- at 94, 497 S.E.2d at 519 (citing Haskins, 188 Va. at 530-31, 50 S.E.2d at
439 (1948)).
11. Id at 93, 497 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting Painter v. Painter, 215 Va. 418, 420,
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perfect circumstantial evidence, it appears that an explicit ad-
mission coupled with laboratory evidence would have been the
only way the petitioner could have met his burden of proof.
Moreover, each court declined to comment on the veracity of the
witness defendant. The result is that adultery is even more
difficult to prove in Virginia after the court of appeal's decision
in Romero.
In another adultery case, Armistead v. Armistead,2 the
court held that a wife's admission of adultery combined with
evidence that friends arranged hotel room meetings with her
alleged paramour was sufficient to meet the burden of proof for
adultery." Curiously, the court stated that the fault had no
adverse economic effects but awarded the wife only forty per-
cent of the property and denied her spousal support, despite
her showing "that she had been unemployed for the past...
thirty years, was in poor health, and had become accustomed to
having maids and other servants." 4 This case indicates that
fault may be a factor in economic awards and is reminiscent of
Theismann v. Theismann,5 which held that it is proper to
base in part an award of alimony and attorney's fees on the
reason for the dissolution of the marriage, such as the
husband's adultery. Furthermore, proof of attorney's charges
submitted in contemplation of a fee award does not have to
include testimony by an expert on the reasonableness of the fee
charged.'
Finally, the decision in Preston v. Preston8 demonstrated
that a spouse must do more than move out of the marital bed-
room to prove desertion. 9 When the couple continued to live
in the same house, their absence from each other's bedrooms
211 S.E.2d 37, 38 (1975)).
12. No. 0614-97-3, 1998 WL 37320, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998).
13. See id. at *2-3.
14. Notes on Recent Appellate Cases, FAM. L. NEWS (Va. State Bar, Richmond,
Va.), Spring 1998, at 30.
15. 22 Va. App. 557, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1996), aff'd on reh'g, 23 Va. App.
697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1996) (en banc).
16. See id. at 572-74, 471 S.E.2d at 816-17.
17. See Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson v. Lake Fairfax Seven Ltd.
Partnership, 253 Va. 93, 480 S.E.2d 471 (1997).
18. Nos. 0071-97-4, 0175-97-4, 1998 WL 15137, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998)
(mem.).
19. See id. at *1.
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only effected an emotional desertion not rising to the level of
desertion from the marriage." The date of separation was
found to be the point of obtaining separate addresses, rather
than separate bedrooms.2'
Romero, Armistead, and Preston all show that fault is held to
a very high standard of proof, which naturally results in some
negative consequences. This high threshold of proof may have
the negative effect of causing more parties to file for divorce on
no-fault grounds, even though the parties may have been truly
damaged by marital misconduct. Trends in reforming no-fault
divorce, however, are gaining momentum nationally as society
sees the very real personal and economic damages suffered by
many innocent spouses in unilateral no-fault divorce.'
2. Spousal Support
In a case clarifying that separate maintenance ends with a
divorce decree, the court of appeals in Scott v. Scott' asserted
that separate maintenance is readily available under Virginia
20. See id. at *1-2 (citing Petachenko v. Petachenko, 232 Va. 296, 298-99, 350
S.E.2d 600, 602 (1986)) ("Desertion requires the break off of marital cohabitation with
the intent to desert. Merely ceasing sexual relations does not constitute desertion.");
Jamison v. Jamison, 3 Va. App. 644, 648, 352 S.E.2d 710, 722 (Ct.',App. 1987)
("[W]hen sexual relations are willfully withdrawn without just cause or excuse, deser-
tion requires 'the breach of other significant marital duties.").
21. See Preston, 1998 WL 15137, at *3.
22. See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault, Divorce, 31
FAMI. L.Q. 269, 276 (1997) (exploring ways in which fault-based factors applied to se-
rious marital misconduct may bring about "enhanced social, economic and legal pro-
tection to spouses on divorce" and establish greater accountability -and responsibility
in marriage). See generally Cynthia Starnes, Reflections on Betty Crocker, Soccer Mom
and ,Divorce: A Message from Detergent Manufacturers, 1997 Wis. I REV. 285 (1997)
(arguing that no-fault divorce has been an economic disaster for women and children).
Michigan is a good example of the many states that are turning to a non-uni-
lateral no-fault ground that requires both spouses to consent to that divorce before
filing for divorce and to "complete, either together or separately, a divorce effects
program." H.B. 5217, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997). House Bill 5217, section 5(2)
sets out the requirements of a divorce effect program, including responses to divorce,
caring for children involved in the action, education about developmental stages,
symptoms of maladjustment to divorce, responses to maladjustment, conflict resolution
skills, stress reduction and parallel and cooperative parenting techniques. See id.
23. 24 Va. App. 364, 482 S.E.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1997). This case hag some excel-
lent language regarding some very basic common law principles.
11691998]
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law.' Such an award, however, depends on a continued mari-
tal relationship.25 Furthermore, the court held that the lower
court had no authority to reopen the wife's earlier separate
maintenance suit after the final divorce decree was entered
awarding her alimony incidental to the separate mainte-
nance.26 An award of support cannot be revived or founded on
a previous award of separate maintenance once the divorce is
final.2
7
One of the most litigated issues with respect to modification
of maintenance awards involves a reduction in income of the
payor spouse. Two years ago, the court upheld the longstanding
rule of voluntariness in Stubblebine v. Stubblebine,' explain-
ing that a reduction in income due to voluntary retirement does
not require a corresponding reduction in support.' Similarly,
this year in upholding a support award of $10,000 per month in
McCombs v. McCombs, ° the court was following the general
rule that adequate consideration must be given to the mainte-
nance of the spouse's standard of living as it was during the
marriage. Drawing a distinction between lifestyle based on
income rather than on debt, the court of appeals held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion."' The court required
the wife to share in the cost of maintaining the marital home
because she enjoyed exclusive possession. 2 Furthermore, the
court required her to share the cost because she would share
equally in the profit from the eventual sale of the house.'
In Jaffe v. Jaffe,4 the court held that periodic support
would not be converted into a lump sum amount of $50,000
despite the husband's claim that a court order to continue
spousal support would prolong a mutually destructive relation-
24. See id. at 370, 482 S.E.2d at 113.
25. See id. at 372, 482 S.E.2d at 114.
26. See id at 365-66, 482 S.E.2d at 111.
27. See id. at 370, 482 S.E.2d at 113.
28. 22 Va. App. 703, 473 S.E.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1996).
29. See id. at 708, 473 S.E.2d at 74.
30. 26 Va. App. 432, 494 S.E.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1998). This appeal, however, was
brought by the wife-payee, who argued that the award was not enough.
31. See id. at 437, 494 S.E.2d at 908.
32. See id at 488, 494 S.E.2d at 909.
33. See id.
34. No. 2348-96-2, 1997 WL 327429, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 17, 1997) (mem.).
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ship. Dissolution does not end a bad relationship; rather, it
merely brings a legal termination to a marriage. The reality is
that emotional and financial consequences can linger for a life-
time.
The peculiar "virtual alimony" decision in White v. White35
was reconsidered and reversed en banc without an opinion. The
original decision held the husband responsible for mortgage
payments characterized as "maintenance and support."" ' At the
second hearing, however, the court held that converting mort-
gage payments into alimony payments after the sale of the
home was wholly improper.
And finally, Leiffer v. Leiffer," was a case involving imputed
income. The court required the husband to pay spousal support
even though he had little income because he refused to accept
two different well-paying jobs with his former enployer.3 9
3. Agreements
In a case regarding the effect of the language used in a post-
separation agreement, the court of appeals ruled in Bergman v.
Bergman4° that property settlement and spousal support agree-
ments will be interpreted under the same rules as any other
contractual agreement.4' The court held that terms such as
"cease" and "reside" shall be interpreted using their plain mean-
ing, rather than viewed as ambiguous terms that allow the
35. 24 Va. App. 297, 482 S.E.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1997), withdrawn and vacated on
reh'g, 26 Va. App. 250, 494 S.E.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
36. See White, 24 Va. App. at 300, 482 S.E.2d at 79.
37. See White, 26 Va. App. at 251, 494 S.E.2d at 162. The husband- appealed this
decision after the court held him in contempt for discontinuing payments when the
house was sold. See White, 24 Va. App. at 300-01, 482 S.E.2d at 79-80.j
38. No. 1035-96-2, 1997 WL 117952, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1997) (mem.).
39. See id. Instead of continuing to work for Sears, his former employer, he de-
cided to go into business for himself making next to nothing in profit. See id.
Also, an interesting case that does not warrant attention in the text is Sjoblom
v. Sjoblom, No. 0204-97-4, 1997 WL 421001, at *1 (Va. App. July 29, 1997) (unpub-
lished decision). Upon her seventh divorce, the court of appeals approved a $50,000
lump sum alimony award to the wife. In addition, the court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to permit discovery to explore the possibility of wrongdoing by the wife in her
prior marriages. See id.
40. 25 Va. App. 204, 487 S.E.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1997).
41. See id. at 211-12, 487 S.E.2d at 267-68.
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admission of parol evidence.42 The court also held that a sepa-
ration agreement may terminate spousal support rights upon
unmarried cohabitation of the recipient with a person of the
opposite sex other than a family member.4"
In Street v. Street," the court determined upon rehearing
that a payor's Attention Deficit Disorder and related depression
and anxiety were not a change of circumstances sufficient to
justify modification of an award of support. The court made this
ruling, however, because it did not find the mental health
expert's opinion persuasive.45
In Sheppard v. Sheppard," a wife who would not sign a
proposed separation agreement was bound by it nevertheless,
because the court determined that she had "agreed in princi-
ple," through a series of letters that passed between the par-
ties, and because she had accepted some of the benefits from
the agreement.4" This decision has alarming implications for
practitioners who advise clients that an agreement is not bind-
ing until signed by the parties.'
Finally, in Pelfrey v. Pelfrey,49 the court of appeals reiterated
that a party to a separation agreement may not have it set
42. See id. at 208, 212, 214, 487 S.E.2d at 266, 268-69. The court clarified the
term "shall cease," stating that it was not an ambiguous term to mean "temporarily
suspended" while the wife was residing with an unrelated male. See id. at 214, 487
S.E.2d at 269. The court ruled that the wife's support was permanently terminated,
rather than temporarily suspended, as the trial court incorrectly had determined. See
id. at 214, 487 S.E.2d at 269.
43. See id. at 214, 487 S.E.2d at 269. For a good overview of the area of cohabi-
tation and spousal support and recent Virginia changes, see Brett R. Turner, Cohabi-
tation and Spousal Support: An Introductory Look at the 1997 Amendments to Virgin-
ia Code § 20-109, 17 FAM. L. NEWS 8 (1997).
44. 24 Va. App. 2, 480 S.E.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1997), reh'g en banc, 25 Va. App.
380, 488 S.E.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1997).
45. See Street, 25 Va. App. at 389-90, 488 S.E.2d at 669-70.
46. No. 2497-96-2, 1997 WL 393181, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. July 15, 1997).
47. See id.
48. A good practitioner may want to state plainly and clearly on the document
that the provisions embodied in the agreement are not binding until that particular
document is completely signed by the parties involved. The Virginia Family Law
Section Newsletter offers this practice tip: "Special stationery with a boldface box
reading "NO CONTRACTUAL PROMISES INTENDED AND SUCH ARE EXPRESSLY
DISAVOWED UNTIL BOTH PARTIES SIGN THE SAME PIECE OF PAPER' is
available from Elden Editions of Arlington, Virginia." FAM. L. NEWS (Va. State Bar,
Richmond, Va.), Fall 1997, at 23.
49. 25 Va. App. 239, 487 S.E.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1997).
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aside as unconscionable unless there is a gross disparity in the
allocation of assets or clear and convincing evidence of
duress."0
4. Property Distribution
Several cases this year dealt with problems of classification
of property. In Moreno v. Moreno,5 the court of appeals deter-
mined that it is proper to divide a pension as a marital asset
under equitable distribution and, subsequently, to include such
income in setting spousal support obligations.52 The argument
of "double-dipping" is still raised when dividing pensions but
with much less effect. Moreno is reminiscent of Frazer v.
Frazer,"5 where the court determined that the obligor's volun-
tary contribution to a retirement account should be included in
calculating spousal and child support."
In Brumskill v. Brumskill, the policy of judicial expediency
justified the court's suspension of a wife's support payments in
an effort to make her retain new counsel to finalize the divorce
after her counsel withdrew. 5 Also, the husband was awarded
a slightly greater share of the marital assets than the wife
when the court contrasted the husband's long history of hard
work with the wife's failure to seek full time employment dur-
ing the twenty-five year childless marriage."
The trial judge in Schill v. Schill, applying the reasoning
of the court in O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin,59 held that a wife's
50. See id. The husband testified that nine months before he signed the agree-
ment, the wife threatened to kill herself if he did not sign it. The duress alleged by
the husband was the result of being advised to get legal counsel of his own, but
choosing not to do so. See i. at 246-47, 487 S.E.2d at 285.
51. 24 Va. App. 190, 480 S.E.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1997).
52. See id
53. 23 Va. App. 358, 477 S.E.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1996).
54. See id. at 378, 477 S.E.2d at 300.
55. No. 0311-97-2, 1997 WL 421000, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. July 29, 1997) (mem.).
56. See id. at *3.
57. See id. The wife said she was under the impression she did not have to
work. See i. This suggests that full-time employment income may be imputed to any
spouse in the dissolution of a marriage without children.
58. No. 1636-96-2, 1997 WL 310062, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 10, 1997) (mem.).
59. 20 Va. App. 522, 528, 458 S.E.2d 323, 326 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a
monetary award to a spouse cannot be reduced as a means to punish that spouse
1998] 1173
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alcoholic behavior must be ignored to avoid prejudice to her."
The trial court found that there was no negative impact from
the alcoholism even though the husband paid the wife's medical
expenses and attorney's fees resulting from a drunken driving
prosecution against her.6' The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's decision. 2 Judge Benton strongly disagreed, stating
that O'Loughlin is clear law but it is not designed for such a
purpose."'
Another case with a persuasive dissent is Manvell v.
Manvell.6 The court did not find enough evidence of dissipa-
tion of assets when a husband, immediately before leaving the
marital home, transferred $56,000 in marital assets to the
couple's oldest child and withdrew another $16,500 which he
lost gambling.65 The court reasoned that the evidence did not
establish that the transfers were made in contemplation of
separation, nor did it establish that the husband intended to
hurt the marriage by doing so.66 Judge Fitzpatrick wrote a
strong dissent stating that Manvell is quite a clear case of
dissipation.67
5. Marital Property Versus Separate Property
In Rowe v. Rowe,' the court determined that an increase in
separate property value during a marriage, which was not at-
tributable to the efforts of either spouse, is not considered an
increase in marital assets. 9 Therefore, interest income on sep-
"for his or her fault without showing such fault had an economic impact on the mar-
riage").
60. See Schill, 1997 WL 310062, at *4.
61. See id. at *5.
62. See id. at *1.
63. See id. at *10 (Benton, J., dissenting). The dissent refers to the distinction
made between behavior-related disease and pure medical illness. See id.
64. No. 2023-96-4, 1997 WL 309612, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 10, 1997) (mem.).
65. See id. at *2, *4.
66. See id. at *4.
67. See id. (Fitzpatrick, J., dissenting).
68. 24 Va. App. 123, 480 S.E.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1997).
69. See id. at 133-35, 480 S.E.2d at 764-66. Although benefits under a retirement
plan administered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") are not
court-assignable, the covered spouse can be ordered to pay from benefits he or she
receives or to pay a lump sum in anticipation of future benefits. This assignment can
go to the spouse or his or her heir. See id.
1174
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arate property remains separate property, even if that interest
is accrued and acquired during the marriage. Separate property
must be traced and clearly identifiable. Otherwise, if commin-
gled with marital funds, the property transmutes, becoming
marital property.70 By contrast, in Bennett v. Bennett,7 the
court of appeals held that disability retirement income is a
pension to be divided as marital property like any other pen-
sion.
The court made some critical determinations about marital
and separate property in Luczkovich v. Luczkovich.73 In this
matter of first impression, the court ruled that severance pay
negotiated and received by the former husband two years after
separation was separate property.74 The court looked to deci-
sions from sister states and stated that "[t]he nature of post-
separation severance pay as replacement for post-separation
wages supports a classification of separate property."75
Additional cases upheld the concept that property acquired
after separation is separate property.76 Military pensions con-
70. See, e.g., Rahbaran v. Rahbaran, 26 Va. App. 195, 494 S.E.2d 135 (Ct. App.
1997); von Raab v. von Raab, 26 Va. App. 239, 494 S.E.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1997).
71. No. 1621-964, 1997 WL 583645, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1991) (mem.).
72. See id. at *2.
73. 26 Va. App. 702, 496 S.E.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1998).
74. See id. at 708-11, 496 S.E.2d at 160-61.
75. Id. at 708, 496 S.E.2d at 160. "The purpose of the severance agreement was
related to the sale of [husband's interest in a drug store], not to husband's work dur-
ing his marriage. Consequently, we hold that wife failed to meet her burden, and the
trial court erred in classifying the lump sum payment as marital property." Id.
On other matters before it,. the court ruled that mutual funds set up- by the
husband with marital assets after the separation were shown to be marital property,
as was a profit-sharing plan. See id. at 702, 496 S.E.2d at 157. The court further
ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in classifying an equity-line
debt as the husband's separate responsibility. See id. at 702-03, 496 S.E.2d at 157.
Similarly, the court did not abuse its discretion in valuing joint accounts as of the
date of the evidentiary hearing, rather than at separation, when the wife had the
opportunity to update values and withdrew her motion for such a valuation. See id.
at 703, 496 S.E.2d at 157.
76. See Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 497 S.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing
the implications, rules, and guidelines for abuse of discretion in various property-re-
lated rulings); Smith v. Warme, No. 1593-97-4, 1998 WL 85404, at *1 (Va. Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 1998) (mem.) (emphasizing that the court of appeals "will not disturb the
[trial] court's classification of property unless the coures decision shows an abuse of
discretion or is unsupported by the evidence."); Matthews v. Matthews, 26 Va. App.
638, 496 S.E.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allocating to the husband the majority of the assets he acquired after
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1165
tinued to be a matter of special concern in the courts," and




The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
("UCCJEA7)7' has been approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and has been offered
to Virginia for adoption.8" No permanent action has been taken
in the General Assembly with respect to this Act. Until the cur-
rent Virginia Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA) 81 is amended, emergency jurisdiction remains some-
what vague.
In Foster-Zahid v. Virginia2 the court found that Virginia
did have jurisdiction, in the absence of a statute, to prosecute a
Wisconsin mother whose interference with child custody impact-
ed the father in Virginia. "The court found that the Virginia
custodial interference statute applies to any person who
withholds a child outside of Virginia from the child's custodial
parent, residing in Virginia, in violation of a Virginia court or-
separation, and where the wife received $22.1 million of the $50.7 million of marital
assets).
77. See Sharbutt-Ridge v. Ridge, Nos. 0736-97-1, 0870-97-1, 1998.WL 74306, at *1
(Va. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1998) (mem.) (discussing the court's lack of jurisdiction over
the tax consequences and intended effect of the Uniformed Service Former Spouses
Protection Act on an incorporated separation agreement); Wisdom v. Hyler, No. 0368-
97-3, 1998 WL 8512, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1998) (mem.) (finding that a Quali-
fied Domestic Relations Order was not a substantive change, and the trial court's
interpretation of the decree was both legally and factually supported).
78. See generally The 1997 Marital Property Rights Symposiuri, 31 FAM. L. Q. 1
(1997) (containing articles such as Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics:
The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law; William A. Reppy, Jr., Apportioning
Business Profits Generated by Spousal Labor and Capital Owned Over Time by Shift-
ing Fractional Shares of the Separate and Community/Marital Estates; Jane B.
Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit); Mark E.
Sullivan, Military Pension Division: Crossing the Minefeld; William M. Troyan, An
Update of Pension Evaluation.
79. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT §§ 101-405, 9
U.L.A. 250 (Supp. 1998).
80. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: A
Search for Definitions and Policy, 31 FAM. L.Q. 613, 634 (1998).
81. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
82. 23 Va. App. 430, 477 S.E.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1996).
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der."' In this case, the noncustodial parent refused to return
the child from visitation in Wisconsin."
Also, a Virginia trial court and the Division of Child Support
Enforcement ("DCSE") had jurisdiction over a husband living in
another country, due to the fact that his family sought help
from the American Embassy by returning to the United States
from Africa, entering into Virginia, and remaining residents
since that time. 5 In Franklin v. Virginia, service of process on
the husband via service on his company's United States office
and several mailed notices were sufficient to generate jurisdic-
tion over him for enforcing child support, thus upholding an
Administrative Support Order.8 The court also had authority
to affirm an "ex parte emergency custody order preventing ei-
ther parent from removing the children from Virginia."" Es-
sentially, when the husband requested a show cause ruling on
the issue of visitation, he automatically waived any jurisdic-
tional objection." Most good attorneys understand that any
petitioning of the court is a waiver of jurisdictional objection.
This case, however, is most significant because it analyzed
the scope of Virginia Code section 20-88.35(5), which is an issue
of first impression in Virginia. The section provides that juris-
diction may be obtained over an individual who has performed
an affirmative act in the state or invoked the laws of the
state.89 The husband stated that he never directed his wife to
move to Virginia, but the court found that in ordering the fami-
ly to leave the marital home in Africa, his children did become
residents of Virginia." This allowed Virginia to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over him. Alternatively, the court held that
the state could exercise personal jurisdiction over the husband
83. Elrod & Spector, supra note 80, at 635 (discussing Foster-Zahid v. Virginia,
23 Va. App. 430, 477 S.E.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1996)).
84. See id
85. See Franklin v. Virginia, 27 Va. App. 136, 147, 497 S.E.2d 881, 886 (Ct. App.
1998).
86. See id. at 140, 497 S.E.2d at 883.
87. Id. ("Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Code
§ 20-126, the JDR court assumed jurisdiction to decide custody and issued an emer-
gency order.").
88. See id at 142, 497 S.E.2d at 884.
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88.35(5) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
90. See Franklin, 27 Va. App. at 142-43, 497 S.E.2d at 884.
11771998]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1165
because he filed a responsive document, thus "having the effect
of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction."9'
7. Custody and Visitation
When a consent order clearly states the terms of custody, no
foreign order will change the terms, regardless of where the
child resides. In Johnson v. Johnson,9 a consent order provid-
ed that a child would live in Sweden for two years, then in
Virginia for two years. The order further provided that Virginia
would remain the child's home state, and no other petition for
custody could be filed anywhere without the Virginia court's
permission.9 Even when a Swedish court gave the mother sole
custody, the Virginia court did not have to afford that decision
any comity, and such a modification was tantamount to "child
snatching."
94
The general rule that only a change of circumstances impact-
ing the best interests of the child can bring about a modifica-
tion in custody was challenged and somewhat twisted in Parish
v. Spaulding.9 Although a prior court order distinctly stated
that the children could not be moved out of the area without
court approval, the custodial parent moved the children to a
distant state when her new spouse was transferred there. The
court apparently viewed this as a pure relocation case, applying
the best interest standards to the changed circumstances.'
This case clearly illustrates how actions of contempt of court
could work to the benefit of the offender, effectively denying the
non-offending parent normal visitation with his children. This
ruling certainly will have further ramifications in the future, if
it is not distinguished as unique.
91. Id. at 146, 497 S.E.2d at 886.
92. 26 Va. App. 135, 493 S.E.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1997).
93. See id. at 148, 493 S.E.2d at 674.
94. See id. at 148-49, 493 S.E.2d at 674. The court of appeals also rejected the
mother's argument that Virginia Code section 20-129 prohibited the Virginia court
from hearing the case while the Swedish case was pending, the trial court's earlier
order gave the Virginia court "priority in time." Id. at 151, 493 S.E.2d at 675.
95. 26 Va. App. 566, 496 S.E.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1998).
96. See id. at 570, 496 S.E.2d at 93.
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In Jones v. Jones,97 the court of appeals reversed the lower
court's decision, granting sole custody back to one of joint custo-
dy. The lower court had overturned a commissioner's report
without writing a detailed explanation which should have in-
cluded evidence regarding the change of a joint custody decision
to sole custody. Strangely, the court cited in its rationale "re-
cent legislation encouraging joint custody in appropriate cas-
es." 8 Such legislation, however, does not exist in Virginia. Al-
though a proposal for joint custody comes up in nearly every
legislative session, it is always set aside. The fact remains that
there is no joint custody presumption in Virginia.99
Bottoms v. Bottoms"°° surfaced again, as many visitation
cases do, and this year the court ruled that it is inappropriate
to overly restrict a parent's visitation. Restriction is proper only
insofar as the parent's conduct detrimentally effects the best
interests of the child.10' This is a general rule which had been
established previously. Several other cases confirmed that the
court only will reverse trial court decisions when there is a
clear abuse of discretion,0 2 and the burden is on the appel-
lant to provide trial court transcripts"° or to show merit of
appellate review.4 '
8. Grandparents
Grandparent visitation remains a hot issue throughout the
nation as many legislatures struggle with statutory visitation
97. 26 Va. App. 689, 496 S.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1998).
98. Id. at 695, 496 S.E.2d at 153.
99. For an interesting article on the important matter of joint custody, see Mar-
garet F. Brinig and F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring. Theories,
73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998). t
100. No. 2157-96-2, 1997 WL 421218, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. July 29, 1997).,
101. See id. at *3.
102. See Tucker v. Tucker, No. 2014-97-3, 1998 WL 127465, at *2 (Va. Ct. App.
Mar. 28, 1998) (mem.); Green v. Morgan, No. 1281-97-4, 1998 WL 15140, at *2 (Va.
Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998) (mem.); Ryan v. Ryan, No. 0266-97-4, 1997 WL 433717, at *1
(Va. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1997) (mem.) (showing sufficient use of the two part test for
modification of visitation).
103. See Diaz v. Morrissey, No. 0654-97-4, 1998 WL 127477, at *1 (Va. Ct. App.
Mar. 24, 1998) (meri.).
104. See Mahler v. Mahler, No. 0739-97-3, 1998 WL 25146, at *1 (Va. Ct. App.
Jan. 27, 1998) (mem.).
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laws for grandparents."5 The language of these statutes was
examined in Virginia in Williams v. Williams."° Here, both
parents were unified in their choice to deny visitation rights to
the grandparents. The court of appeals held that the parents
have a fundamental right to deny visitation based on the Four-
teenth Amendment; °7 therefore, any interference in the par-
ent-child relationship can only be justified by a compelling state
interest, such as precluding activity that would prove harmful
or detrimental to the child's health or welfare." 8 For the court
to order visitation, it must determine that denial of nonparent
visitation would be harmful to the welfare of the child.'"
In another case, by broadly construing visitation laws to
include any person with a legitimate interest, the court allowed
standing for the visitation action of a sibling and the grandpar-
ents of three children who were adopted by nonrelatives." °
The court's rationale was that the blood relationship was not
terminated by adoption."'
9. Adoption
In 1997, probably the most important adoption case in Vir-
ginia was Hickman v. Futty."' The court limited the construc-
tion of Virginia Code section 63.1-225.1,"' holding that the
new statute is a codification of existing case law addressing the
standard of proof necessary to terminate parental rights and to
adopt despite a parent's objection."' The court found that
when the parents withhold their consent to terminate their pa-
105. North Carolina is one example. After much debate, this year, the North Caro-
lina legislature did not carry over a proposal entitled "Grandparent Visitation," H.R.
82, Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1987) (providing an expansion of rights under existing law per-
taining to grandparent visitation).
106. 24 Va. App. 778, 485 S.E.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1997).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
108. See Williams, 24 Va. App. at 783, 485 S.E.2d at 654.
109. See id. at 784-85, 485 S.E.2d at 654. The opinion gives no evidence of the
parents' unfitness or inability to make good choices for their children.
110. See Thrift v. Baldwin, 23 Va. App. 18, 20, 473 S.E.2d 715, 716 (Ct. App.
1996).
111. See id.
112. 25 Va. App. 420, 489 S.E.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1997).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
114. See Hickman, 25 Va. App. at 431-32, 489 S.E.2d at 237.
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rental rights, and a continuing relationship between parent and
child will prove to be detrimental to the child, such withholding
is contrary to the child's best interests."5 This case is signifi-
cant because the disposition of the appeal turned on a construc-
tion and application of Virginia Code section 63.1-225.1, which
had not been addressed in prior cases. The court found that the
section "codifies the standard promulgated by the Virginia ap-
pellate courts in cases decided under prior law and that the
evidence in the present case supports the circuit court's finding
under that standard.""' As a result, this court concluded that
the parent "withheld her consent to the adoption contrary to
the child's best interests.""7
A very clear case of unreasonably withheld consent, however,
was Winfield v. Urquhart."' The court found that when a fa-
ther withholds his consent to adoption after he murdered the
children's mother, that consent clearly is withheld unreasonably
and contrary to the best interests of the child."'
10. Child Support
Choice of law with child support is still a viscid area, even in
light of the Federal Child Support Recovery Act 2. and the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA)."2 ' In
115. See id.
116. Id. at 422, 489 S.E.2d at 233. A thorough reading of the case reveals extend-
ed analysis of Virginia Code section 63.1-225.1, as well as a history of the case law
in Virginia. Some commentators may believe that this decision overly burdens
parent's rights; however, the opinion states that the parent's negative choices in her
relationship with the child clearly demonstrated that the mother was "unable or un-
willing to care for the child," rendering this case more of a "best interests" ruling. Id.
at 433-34, 489 S.E.2d at 238.
117. Id. at 433-34, 489 S.E.2d at 238.
118. 25 Va. App. 688, 492 S.E.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1997).
119. See id at 696, 492 S.E.2d at 467.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992).
121. UNiF. INTERSTATE, FAMILY SUPPORT ACT §§ 101-905, 9 U.L.A. 322 (Supp.
1998). UIFSA does not give child support jurisdiction where there is no personal ju-
risdiction over the payor, but according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, an Oklahoma father who had never lived in Virginia or been ordered to
make any child support payments, can be criminally prosecuted in federal court in
Virginia because the mother and child had moved there. See United States v. Mur-
phy, 117 F.3d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Saleem v. Saleem,'" the parties specifically agreed to apply
New York law. The trial court erred in awarding "child support
based on New York law without first determining whether the
presumptive amount of support calculated pursuant to Virginia
child support guidelines was inappropriate."" The court ex-
plained that Virginia law must be applied first, after which
New York law could then be viewed as a factor in considering
any deviation."
In Layman v. Layman," the court of appeals determined
that an obligor may not avoid child support because of his or
her imprisonment. The court opined that an obligor's incarcera-
tion is considered "voluntary unemployment" and does not
warrant a reduction of child support obligation." In another
case, the court of appeals held that when child support
amounts are set in an agreement, unless the amounts consti-
tute a significant deviation from the presumptively correct
amounts delineated in the guidelines, the agreement does not
justify a substantial deviation at a later point in time.'27
Again, the court reiterated that it will not overturn a trial
court's decision without a clear abuse of discretion.1
122. 26 Va. App. 384, 494 S.E.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1998).
123. Id. at 393, 494 S.E.2d at 888.
124. See id. at 391-92, 494 S.E.2d at 887. The court finally determined that the
cutoff age of 18 years provided in the Virginia agreement and not the 21 years age
of support in New York would apply. See Virginia Law Applied to Establish Child
Support Despite Contrary Agreement, 2 Fax News UPDATE (ABA Family Law Section
Newsletter), Mar. 1998, at 1 (discussing the case).
125. 25 Va. App. 365, 488 S.E.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1997).
126. See id. at 367-68, 488 S.E.2d at 659.
127: See Zientek v. Zientek, No. 1358-97-2, 1998 WI. 85396, at *1 (Va. Ct. App.
Mar. 3, 1998) (mem.). The trial court had granted the father's, motion to reduce his
child support, setting it at an amount that still exceeded the guidelines by $727. See
id. at *9. The trial court however, based its decision on evidence of the parties' in-
tent in a separation agreement. See id. at *9-10.
128. See Byrd v. Byrd, No. 2485-96-4, 1998 WL 136484, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar.
28, 1998) (mem.). The petitioner relied on Frazer v. Frazer, 23 Va. App. 358, 477
S.E.2d (Ct. App. 1996), to show that the trial court failed first to determine equitable
distribution, then spousal support. The petitioner argued that this sequence is neces-
sary to determine the gross income upon which to base child support. The Byrd
court, however, rejected this argument, stating that Frazer was decided after this
trial, and "Mr. Byrd did not object to the sequence until the motion to reconsider
when he had retained new counsel. He will not be heard to object to that in which
he had previously acquiesced." Byrd, 1998 WL 136434, at *1, (citing Lee v. Lee, 12
Va. App. 512, 404 S.E.2d 736 (Ct. App. 1991)); see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18.
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Walker v. May' declared that a court order or a specific
agreement provision is needed to modify support if one of the
children turns eighteen and a single combined amount is listed
as the child support obligation for two or more children.30 As
a result of this ruling, downward modification of support is not
automatic, absent specific language in an order or an agree-
ment.
Finally, laches can apply to bar paternity actions. For exam-
ple, in Payne v. Lynchburg DSS,"' a father's inexcusable de-
lays in asserting paternity for more than ten years kept him
from claiming any rights he might have as a parent. Also worth
noting is Pavlick v. Pavlick,"2 where the court clarified that
intra-family immunity does not apply when the death of an un-
emancipated child results from the intentional act of his par-
ent.
13
B. Circuit Court Opinions
1. Marriage
Several interesting cases in the circuit courts dealt with mar-
riage, one specifically reflecting unique cultural issues of first
impression in Virginia. Derakhshan v. Derakhshan"M involved
the equitable distribution of a "marriage portion" created to be
part of a marriage contract, which is common among Iranians
living in the United States. Being part of a marriage contract
marriage, the marriage portion promise was binding as a nup-
tial agreement. Accordingly, the marriage portion of twenty
million Rials was ruled to be separate and exclusive property
once it was paid to the recipient upon the consummation of the
marriage, even when consummation occurred incidental to the
promise to marry.
35
129. No. 1266-97-4, 1998 WL 37313, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998) (mem.).
130. See id. at *1.
131. No. 2536-96-3, 1997 WL 310058, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 10, 1997) (mem.).
The children were 11 and 12 at the time that the putative father eventually made a
personal appearance in court.
132. 254 Va. 176, 491 S.E.2d 602 (1997).
133. See id. at 182, 491 S.E.2d at 604. This rule does bar recovery in unintention-
al non-automobile or non-business related situations.
134. 42 Va. Cir. 411 (Fairfax County 1997).
135. See id. at 412. The reasoning was that sexual intercourse between married
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Another case regarding a marital agreement was McCall v.
McCall."6 In that case, the court held that an agreement may
only be revoked by a written document signed by the parties,
assuming the parties entered into the agreement of their own
free will and free of duress .1 7 The doctrine of estoppel is still
available in all proceedings related to settlement agreements
and marital dissolution."
2. Dissolution and Property Distribution
When husbands and wives are matched unevenly in their
financial abilities, that disparity shows up in equitable distribu-
tion and dissolution. Kennedy v. Kennedy'39 illustrates this
point. The wife handled the financial affairs for the family,
from paying mortgage payments to holding a note on sold real
estate. She did not keep good records and could not adequately
"trace" her separate property contributions; therefore, her sepa-
rate payments on the marital home were classified as marital
property." Furthermore, even though the husband's auto re-
pair business failed, the court determined that his mismanage-
ment did not amount to dissipation.' The court ruled that
the wife's earnings were critical in maintaining the family and
upheld a seventy to thirty percent split of the marital assets in
her favor.'
General rules regarding the extinguishment of joint tenancies
and tenancies by the entirety upon divorce were upheld in
McDaniel v. May." The general rule regarding use of parol
evidence to aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous property
couples is necessary to consummate a marriage, thus making the sexual requirement
of the marriage portion promise non-meretricious because they were married. See id.
136. 43 Va. Cir. 296 (Rockingham County 1997).
137. See id. at 301.
138. See id. The opinion stated that 'jtihe Courts in Virginia have long held that
the doctrine of estoppel or equitable estoppel is available in all proceedings including
those relating to property settlement agreements and the dissolution of marriages."
Id. (citing Webb v. Webb, 16 Va. App. 486, 428 S.E. 2d 762 (Ct. App. 1993)); Emrich
v. Emrich, 9 Va. App. 288, 387 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1989)).




143. 43 Va. Cir. 589 (Spotsylvania County 1997).
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settlement agreement was invoked in Charles v. Pippert.'"
Also, Forsythe v. Forsythe45 held that stock options which
were paid out or exercised, as well as bonuses and inheritances,
are considered gross income under Virginia Code section 20-108.2(C).146
In Rutledge v. Rutledge,"' the court held that because equi-
table distribution of marital property envisions a complete divi-
sion of assets when an award of retirement benefits would be
de minimis, the court should not make such an award." In
Rebhun v. Rebhun,"' the court determined that a mutual
oversight in a stipulation at an equitable distribution hearing,
later incorporated in a divorce decree may be corrected by the
court under Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B).'
3. Spousal Support
General rules were again followed in Patterson v.
Patterson,5' in which the court held that voluntary unemploy-
ment or underemployment does not relieve an obligor of spousal
support because income will be imputed to that obligor. Vol-
untary underemployment and arguments as to imputation of
144. 41 Va. Cir. 494, 496 (Stafford County 1997).
145. 41 Va. Cir. 82 (Fairfax County 1996).
146. See id. at 83.
147. 41 Va. Cir. 89 (Spotsylvania County 1996).
148. See id. at 91.
149. 40 Va. Cir. 385 (Fairfax County 1996).
150. See id. at 386.
151. 41 Va. Cir. 353 (Richmond City 1997). This case was particularly interesting
because the husband was an equity partner in the Richmond law firm of McGuire,
Woods, Battle & Boothe, LL.P. who was given a one-year contract due to his less
than acceptable performance. He told the court he planned to open a cigar store in
Savannah, Georgia, sometime in the spring of 1997, rather than look for another
legal position with a law firm. The attorney estimated his expected monthly salary to
be nearly $7,000 less than what he made at the firm. See id. at 353. The court said
that the husband's efforts to find new employment were insufficient to warrant a
reduction in a spousal support obligation. See id. at 357. Evidence came to light that
suggested the husband's problems at work were linked to a romantic affair that led
to his divorce. See id. at 355. The court imputed to the husband one-half of his sala-
ry at the law firm and ordered him to pay spousal support in the amount of $2,000
per month. This was done despite the fact that his expenses were $3,600 per month,
and his wife's projected expenses were $9,000 per month. The court explained that,
"[ijn light of Patterson's loss of employment, however, both of them will have to make
do with less." Id- at 358.
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income likewise may be considered in a motion for pendente lite
spousal support."2
When a fraudulent dilution of a corporation's stock is deter-
mined to be a fraudulent conveyance, the spouse entitled to
support or equitable distribution may sue to set aside that
fraudulent conveyance." In addition, an ex-wife "is not re-
quired ... to exhaust her separate estate prior to receiving an
increase"" in spousal support, as long as she can show "by a
preponderance of the evidence that there has been a material
change in circumstances ... that... warrants modification in
the level of support."'
With respect to attorney's fees, the court has determined that
an attorney's lien on alimony payments is contrary to public
policy and unenforceable, even though liens can be established
by contract alone.' Furthermore, a claim for separate main-
tenance is within the jurisdiction of a court of equity.57 Such
a court may determine incidental issues of child support and
child custody."
4. Child Custody and Visitation
When "a court of competent jurisdiction has made an award
of custody, the party seeking to change the custody has the
burden of showing a material change of circumstances before
the custody award will be changed."'59 "The fact that a parent
lives with someone in a romantic relationship who is not his or
her spouse" can be considered as such a change."6 As a mat-
ter of law, adult children cannot be denied visitation with a
parent who desires visitation even when the parent's spouse
152. See Eisenach v. Eisenach, 41 Va. Cir. 94, 95 (Fairfax County 1996). In this
case the wife was found to be voluntarily underemployed and income was imputed to
her. See id. at 99.
153. See Efessiou v. Efessiou, 41 Va. Cir. 142, 144-45 (Fairfax County 1996).
154. Smith v. Smith, 43 Va. Cir. 93, 94 (Loudoun County 1997).
155. Id. at 93.
156. See Fiske v. Fiske, 43 Va. Cir. 62, 64 (Alexandria City 1997).
157. See Hart v. Hart, 41 Va. Cir. 456, 457 (Virginia Beach City 1997).
158. See id.
159. In re Junious, 43 Va. Cir. 440, 440 (Richmond City 1997) (citing Keel v. Keel,
225 Va. 606, 611, 303 S.E.2d 917 (1983)).
160. Id. at 441-42.
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seeks to prevent and restrict such visitation.16' However, an
eight-year-old child is too young to determine his own visitation
schedule with his noncustodial parent.'62
When Virginia is the child's home state, Virginia courts
should exercise jurisdiction. However, neither the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA7) nor the Parental Kid-
napping Protection Act ("PKPA") applies to child custody pro-
ceedings in a state other than the child's home state.1" In ad-
dition, a Virginia court does not have jurisdiction when it is not
the child's home state, or when the matter has no significant
connection to Virginia.'"
5. Child Support
As revealed in earlier court decisions, when a parent obligor
e:periences a loss of income resulting from imprisonment fol-
lowing a conviction of a crime, a reduction in child support is
not justified.'" A person who is incarcerated for the commis-
sion of a crime is voluntarily unemployed for the purposes of
calculating child support."
"As a general rule, a court should not impute to a person
income from more than one job" in calculating child sup-
port.' 7 The party desiring to have such income imputed bears
the burden of proof.'" Furthermore, "the equitable defense of
laches is not a defense to the failure to comply with the terms
of a [child] support [order],"'69 and "an award of attorney's
fees in a child support enforcement proceeding may be excepted
from [a bankruptcy] discharge" where the fees are in the nature
161. See Smith v. Markham, 41 Va. Cir. 166, 169 (Fairfax County 1996).
162. See Schafer v. Kibling, 43 Va. Cir. 614 (Fairfax County 1997).
163. See Wheaton v. Wheaton, 42 Va. Cir. 139, 139 (Fairfax County 1997).
164. See Taylor v. Taylor, 42 Va. Cir. 190, 191 (Fairfax County 1997).
165. See Gouterman v. Gouterman, 41 Va. Cir. 331, 331 (Fairfax County 1997).
166. See Division of Child Support Enforcement v. Huddleston, 42 Va. Cir. 443,
445 (Salem City 1997).
167. Callahan v. Crupper, 43 Va. Cir. 215, 217 (Loudoun County 1997) (citing
Cochran v. Cochran, 14 Va. App. 827, 830, 419 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Ct. App. 1992)).
168. See id. at 218.
169. Carter v. Hall, 42 Va. Cir. 437, 438 (Roanoke City 1997) (citing Wheeler v.
Wheeler, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 426 (Ct. App. 1994) (unpublished); Richardson v.
Moore, 217 Va. 422, 423-24, 229 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1976)).
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of child support.7 ° Finally, a third party who is alleged to be
the natural father of a child born to a woman who is married
to the complainant cannot be joined in a suit for divorce and
child support.'
C. Summary
This year, the judiciary generally followed well established
general rules but it deviated in the areas of very heightened
proof for fault grounds, the weight given to parents' rights, and
opportunistic custodial modification circumstances. Petitioner
claims are becoming more unique, while good legal strategy
remains solidly based on rules rather than political rhetoric.
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In the Virginia General Assembly, the January term started
out politically volatile, which took much energy away from
legislative proposals. A few interesting and strategic bills were
proposed, and some eventually became law. Others were tabled
or carried over to the 1999 term.
A. Major Legislative Changes
More than sixty bills pertaining to family law were intro-
duced in the 1998 legislative session, nineteen of which were
enacted. No amendments were made to divorce or equitable
distribution this past year, but there were numerous technical
amendments to the application of child support guidelines.
These amendments included court authority to order child tax
exemptions,'72 establishment of a State Case Registry within
the Department of Social Services for all child support case
170. Moreno v. Moreno, 43 Va. Cir. 576, 576 (Loudoun County 1997).
171. See Schreiber v. Schreiber, 43 Va. Cir. 274, 275-76 (Fairfax County 1997).
172. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2D-108.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998). The Virginia General As-
sembly enacted Virginia Code section 20-108.1(E), authorizing the court to require
.one party to execute all appropriate tax forms or waivers to grant to the other party
the right to take the income tax dependency exemption for any tax year or future
years, for any child or children of the parties for federal and state tax purposes." Id.
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records, paternity establishment and support,1 73 and statutory
computation of support where disability insurance is re-
ceived. 4 The most important changes, however, are detailed
below.
1. Spousal Support
The most significant family law legislation enacted in the
past year was House Bill 517,"75 addressing rehabilitative ali-
mony. The bill, amending Virginia Code sections 20-107.1 and
20-109,176 authorizes a court to order alimony for a specific
duration of time, with or without reservations. These new
rules 17 apply to spousal support matters in both circuit courts
and in Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts. Specifi-
cally, the statute provides "for a defined duration, or in periodic
payments for an undefined duration, or in a lump sum, or in
any combination thereof."' 78 The factors relating to the impact
of fault on spousal support were not changed by the statute,
but the statutory factors to be considered by the court in de-
termining any spousal support award, including rehabilitative
support were updated. The significant factors include "any spe-
cial circumstances of the family,"79 and "the extent to which
the age, physical or mental condition or special circumstances of
173. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.1:3 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
174. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998) (stating that gross income
includes disability insurance benefits).
175. H.B. 517, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (enacted as Act of Apr. 15,
1998, ch. 604, 1998 Va. Acts 1410).
176. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107.1, -109 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
177. The language and application of these spousal support provisions were largely
the result of the study and report of the Family Law Section of the Virginia State
Bar on Rehabilitative Alimony and the Reservation of Spousal Support in Divorce
Proceedings. See H.D. 55, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(C). "Defined duration" is defined in section 20-
107.1(G) as a period of time having a "specific beginning and ending date, or speci-
fied in relation to the occurrence or cessation of an event or condition." I& § 20-
107.1(G).
179. Id. § 20-107.1(E)(4).
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any child of the parties would make it appropriate that a party
not seek employment outside of the home."'
These changes appear consistent with the concept that spous-
es are not only mutually obligated and dependent on each other
financially, but families are interdependent as well. In light of
this fact, economics should follow accordingly. Although this
concept is important, the court, in making a spousal support
award, is required to consider the decisions made during the
marriage regarding parenting arrangements and career opportu-
nities and the length of time a party is absent from the job
market. 8' This reflects a legislative recognition of the impor-
tance of past and present family unity in the midst of apparent
family breakdown.
Other amendments address career opportunities, the parties'
history, and the costs of acquiring vocational and educational or
employment skills.'82 This allows a spouse to obtain an award
for the education or training that might be necessary to enable
him or her to be financially self-sufficient. The court also has
the authority to consider a party's contribution to the other's
education or career training.1
Furthermore, one subsection of the statute provides that a
court may reserve the right of spousal support, but there re-
mains a rebuttable presumption that the reservation will con-
tinue for a period equal to one half the duration of the mar-
riage."M Essentially, the court now has the authority to in-
crease, decrease or terminate "the amount or duration of any"
award." In other words, the court may also modify an award
of rehabilitative spousal support. That modification must be
based upon a finding that there has been a material change of
circumstances that were "not reasonably in the contemplation of
the parties when the award was made."8 ' This statutory
180. Id. § 20-107.1(E)(5).
181. See id. § 20-107.1(E)(11).
182. See id. § 20-107.1(EX9).
183. See id. § 20-107.1(E)(12).
184. See id. § 20-107.1(D). The duration of a marriage is considered the time from
the date of marriage to the date of separation, and once granted, the period of reser-
vation "shall not be subject to modification." Id.
185. Id. § 20-109(A).
186. Id. § 20-109(B).
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change appears to indicate a trend in Virginia away from the
concept of spousal support in perpetuity toward economic self-
sufficiency. This would be true even for a man or a woman who
may have entered into a marriage relying otherwise, without
the expectation of economic self-sufficiency much less a legal
necessity. Today any such reliance is blind ignorance and will
only work to the detriment of the non-income producing spouse.
2. Domestic Violence
The scope of protective orders, particularly in the case of
family abuse or stalking, was expanded pursuant to the codifi-
cation of House Bill 291.187 This new law permits the filing of
an emergency protective order petition by a law enforcement
officer on behalf of a party who is mentally or physically inca-
pable of filing the petition." This law also gives priority on
the docket to abuse petitions.'89 Virginia appears to be putting
strong measures in place to take a stand against family vio-
lence.
3. Reconciliation in Marital Agreements
According to Virginia's application of the Premarital Agree-
ment Act, in order for a party who seeks -to reconcile with his
or her estranged spouse to continue to receive the protections of
the separation agreement, the terms of the agreement must
permit such an arrangement. 9 ' Recognizing the opportunity
and potential for reconciliation may encourage some parties to
reach an agreement when they otherwise would not, and it may
even encourage family rebuilding where appropriate.
187. H.B. 291, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (enacted as Act of Apr. 16,
1998, ch. 677, 1998 Va. Acts 1551).
188. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
189. See id. Emergency protective orders are valid for 72 hours after issuance or
shall be extended to 5:00 p.m. on the next business day that the Juvenile Domestic
Relation Court is in session.
190. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-147-155 (Repl. Vol. 1995). This was implied by dicta
in Smith v. Smith, 19 Va. App. 155, 449 S.E.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1994) regarding prop-
erty settlement agreements and tentative reconciliation. When drafting an agreement
for clients experiencing emotional confusion while settling their property differences, it
is always helpful to consider any and all possibilities.
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4. Marriage
In 1997, Virginia reiterated that marriage is limited to the
legally sanctioned union of a man and a woman.19' In light of
the national passage of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA)' which anticipated litigation over same-sex marriage
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,' 93 Virginia has re-
sponded with a traditional and historical definition of marriage.
The statute reads that "[a] marriage between persons of the
same sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered into by persons of
the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such
marriage shall be void and unenforceable."" The validity of
the current institution of marriage itself continues to face oppo-
sition, and new innovations to strengthen and uphold marriage
in its traditional context are demanding attention.
5. Miscellaneous
Both houses of the Virginia General Assembly proposed bills
to add to Virginia Code section 18.2-74.2, which bans partial
birth abortions.'95 Governor Gilmore signed the Senate bill on
April 13, 1998.'9 A ban on assisted suicide passed both hous-
es. "'97 Also, a bill expanding the definition of infant neglect to
191. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
192. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(c) (West Supp. 1997).
193. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
194. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Cum. Supp. 1997). The second sentence was added
in the 1997 session of the Virginia General Assembly.
195. See H.B. 1154, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (enacted as Act of Apr.
15, 1998, ch. 579, 1998 Va. Acts 1366); S.B. 552, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998)
(enacted as Act of Apr. 13, 1998, ch. 448, 1998 Va. Acts 625). A different bill, H.B.
1371, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998), regarding informed consent, required
abortion providers to give mothers "all information regarding alternative procedures
and side effects at least 24 hours before performing an abortion." THE FAMILY FOUN-
DATION, PRO-FAMILY GAINS & LOSSES: 1998 GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1 (Apr. 14, 1998).
This bill passed the House but was defeated in the Senate Education and Health
Committee by a vote of nine to six. See id. at 3.
196. See Andrew Cain, Gilmore Signs Bill to Ban Partial-Birth Abortions, WASH.
TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1998, at C3. "Not only will this save the lives of many unborn chil-
dren, it will safeguard the lives and the health of women in Virginia as well,' Mr.
Gilmore said." Id.
197. See H.B. 1378, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (enacted as Act of Apr.
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include in utero substance abuse by a mother became law this
year. 9' A bill to decriminalize "crimes against nature" was
defeated," and a bill to add "sexual orientation" to the list of
classes protected from hate crimes was also defeated." Paren-
tal consent to abortion laws were implemented this year,2'
and courts are enforcing the provision allowing a minor to
avoid the required parental notice by seeking judicial authoriza-
tion instead.2"2 The court will immediately appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent the child seeking the abortion, thereby
providing legal representation to the minor child as she makes
life-changing decisions.2 3
B. Carried Over Bills
1. Marriage and Divorce
The Virginia Covenant Marriage Act2" received a tremen-
dous amount of attention this past year, and it largely follows
the trend in many states toward buttressing marriage. Allowing
couples to choose a form of marriage that would provide safe-
guards on the timeliness and manner of divorce, this law is
perhaps the most positive and innovative of its kind the Assem-
bly has seen. "Although widely reported as abolishing No-Fault'
divorce for those couples who choose this form of marriage, the
Act still allows a divorce after living separate and apart for two
years."205 The statute requires the parties to a marriage to
"recite and sign a declaration of intent"2° acknowledging that
marriage is a lifetime commitment. The statute further requires
counseling for couples contemplating marriage, "concerning the
15, 1998, ch. 624, 1998 Va. Acts 1456).
198. See S.B. 557, Va. Gen Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (enacted as Act of Apr. 16,
1998, ch. 704, 1998 Va. Acts 1629).
199. See S.B. 583, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
200. See H.B. 310, 311, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998); S.B. 159, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
201. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. H.B. 1056, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999).
205. Elrod & Spector, supra note 80, at 647.
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-37.4 (Cure. Supp. 1998).
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nature and responsibilities of a marital relationship. °7 Cbun-
seling prior to filing for divorce is required as well, promoting
discussion about "the nature, purpose and responsibilities of a
marital relationship and the legal grounds for terminating a
covenant marriage by divorce." °s In the midst of a myriad of
laws governing the dissolution of marriage, this statute pro-
motes marriage as a lifetime relationship of rights as well as
responsibilities, encouraging couples to contemplate the institu-
tion and commitment seriously before entering into marriage,
thereby buttressing marital stability."9 Furthermore, Virginia
Code section 20-37.4 allows all other divorce grounds to remain
the same and forces no one to stay in a marital relationship
that would endanger his or her safety and well-being. The stat-
ute is a manifestation of Virginia's desire to build strong mar-
riages from the outset, and will be reviewed and voted on again
in December 1998.
The McClure Bill was a separate proposal designed to protect
children of divorce and limit the loss of bargaining power of the
victim spouse in a no-fault divorce.210 This bill proposed to
add sub-subsection (d) to section 20-91(9) of the Virginia Code,
governing no-fault divorce, which renders subsection (9) inappli-
cable when there are minor children born to or adopted by the
parties.21" ' This statute requires the victim's spouse to file a
written objection to the no-fault divorce "within twenty-one days
of service of the initial pleading requesting a [no-fault] di-
vorce."2 A minor amendment that can provide major relief,
this bill's most salient feature is that it allows the innocent
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Persons who are already married may redesignate their marriage as a cove-
nant marriage after they obtain marital counseling and execute a declaration of in-
tent. See id. Some attorneys may see this bill as being bad for business or bad for
women and children, but just the opposite is true. Divorce is still allowable for all
the usual reasons in Virginia, with no-fault grounds requiring a two-year waiting
period, rather than the current one year with children and six months without chil-
dren. Women and children, in particular, benefit when the parties to the marriage
approach their own responsibilities to the other family members as a lifetime commit-
ment, rather than a convenience or economic burden.
210. H.B. 2624, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
211. See id.
212. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Cum. Supp. 1998); see also So What's All This




party a forum not otherwise afforded, giving him or her some
bargaining power in reaching an agreement where appropriate.
A bill regarding divorce will also be before the General As-
sembly in December of 1998. The bill requires the court to
order parties with a minor child to attend an educational pro-
gram on the effects of divorce on children and requires "the
parties to submit a unified parenting plan to the court, which
shall outline the rights and duties of each parent, along with a
residential schedule for each child."213 Like the Covenant Mar-
riage Act,214 this bill does not materially change divorce
grounds, nor does it mandate state interference in parenting;
rather, it places the responsibility for the children's health and
well being with the parents.
Finally, a bill requiring the filing of a final divorce decree as
proof of dissolution of a prior marriage when applying for a
marriage license will be reviewed again in December.215 This
has been a matter of law in numerous state jurisdictions for a
long time. This bill greatly assists in record-keeping procedures,
while also thwarting potential fraud.
2. Joint or Shared Custody
The custody carry-over bill defines a "day" for purposes of
applying the shared custody rules of the child support guide-
lines to mean an overnight stay, including periods when a par-
ent has visitation with a child. 6 This bill would effectively
overrule the majority opinion in Ewing v. Ewing,"7 which
held that a day is a continuous twenty-four-hour period of time.
A bill codifying a presumption of joint custody, something.not
yet adopted in Virginia, uses the term "shared parenting" to
replace the "best interests" standard in custody and visitation
213. H.B. 1235, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999). "If the
parties cannot agree on a unified plan, each ... submit[s]" his or her own to the
court for judicial review and determination. Id.
214. H.B. 1056, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999).
215. See ILB. 452, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999).
216. See S.B. 471, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999).
217. 21 Va. App. 34, 461 S.E.2d 417 (1995).
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cases.218 There are no plans to bring this bill back in Decem-
ber, but it continues to surface regularly.
3. Adoption
Two significant bills regarding adoption and birth fathers
were carried over to the December session, namely the putative
father registry,219 and a bill nullifying the paternal consent to
adoption requirement if the father has been convicted of sex
crimes or child abuse and neglect crimes.o Currently, consent
of the birth father to an adoption is waived only if the child
was conceived when he raped the child's mother." 1 Many
states across the country, including Arizona and New York,
have adopted the putative father registry with great suc-
cess.' In Virginia, this bill would create a registry within the
Department of Social Services which would contain names of
men ivho have acknowledged paternity either through personal
acknowledgement, a court order, or some other public
record."m This registry places all the names of potential birth
fathers who could be a party to an adoption proceeding in one
location.' The goal is to provide putative fathers with the
opportunity, within a statutory period of time, to assert their
parental rights prior to or during an adoption proceeding, af-
fording them with adequate notice and hearing. The registry
also holds appropriate parties responsible for their children.
The putative father registry would help to avoid adoption night-
mares like that of the high profile cases of Baby Richard2"
and Baby Jessica. 8
o218. See H.B. 1239, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998); S.B. 507, 671, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
219. See H.B. 840, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999).
220. See H.B. 910, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999).
221. See VA. CODE ANN.. § 63.1-220.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
222. The putative father registry statute is codified in Arizona and in New York
among other states. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01 (West Supp. 1997); N.Y.
DoM. REL. § 111-a (Consol. Supp. 1998). It has offered great success in assuring that
birth fathers who are interested in preserving their parental rights have an opportu-
nity to do so.
223. See H.B. 840, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999).
224. See id.
225. See Baby Richard v. Kirschner, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995).




The Virginia legislature is apparently a family friendly insti-
tution, favoring initiatives that uphold marriage and family as
positive ideals in our culture. Much attention has been given to
the harm of divorce, particularly to children, but no empirical
studies anywhere in the country have been done on that topic
to date. One such study was proposed this year to the Virginia
Legislature but, unfortunately, was disregarded by the current
Assembly. When the United States Census Bureau reports that
between 1970 and 1996 "It]he number of divorced persons has
more than quadrupled, from 4.3 million... to 18.3 mil-
lion, 7 there should be some cause for concern for re-stabili-
zation of a continually progressive society whose divorce pat-
terns are wreaking havoc on the lives of children. The bills
passed into law and carried over to the next legislative session,
however, are positive steps to 'remedy this problem of massive
marital and, thus, family breakdown.
IV. CONCLUSION
The past year has been extremely important in the history of
the Commonwealth both judicially and legislatively. Virginia
has stated a clear commitment to family, and it appears that as
the. national debate continues over the definition- of marriage,
Virginia is making a strong statement to respect stable families
that are building solid citizens for the state's future. While
Virginia is moving more honorably toward these basic institu-
tions, the national legal community appears to be working over-
time to provide broader definitions of marriage and broader
approaches to no-fault divorce and faultless property distribu-
tion.' "Debates are likely over the effects of a 'no fault' sys-
tem as social science data continues to show the economic and
emotional harms to children (and thus to society) from parental
227. Arlene F. Salvter & Terry A. Lugaila, Marital States and Living Ar-
rangements: March 1996 (visited June 17, 1998) <http'/www.census.gov/prod/3/98
pubs/p20-496.pdf>.
228. American Law Institute proposals contain such broader avenues for no-fault
divorce. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION (Tentative Draft May 1996).
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conflict and divorce."229 Virginia can continue to be a point of
light for the rest of the nation by continuing to pursue its time
honored commitment to the family.
229. Elrod & Spector, supra note 80, at 659. "But in today's climate of advancing
technology, more nontraditional families, and more struggles between the rights of
individuals and the rights of the 'family,' policymakers face even greater challenges in
the years ahead." Id.
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